



































































Using formal and informal criteria, we test whether GCC is an optimum currency 
area (OCA). Based on the traditional OCA criteria, we find that GCC countries are 
yet to fulfill the necessary pre-conditions for the establishment of Currency Union 
(CU). The structure of their economies remains dominated by the oil sector, intra-
regional trade is very limited and, unlike what many believe, there does not seem to 
be evidence of convergence in their main macroeconomic  fundamentals nor 
synchronization of  their business cycles. The more formal test based on the 
Generalized Purchasing Power Parity Theory (G-PPP), shows that real exchange 
rates in GCC are closely related and share the same stochastic trend and hence points 
to the readiness, although to different degrees, of the countries of the region for CU.  
We argue that the main factors that are favorable for the establishment of CU are the 
commitment by all GCC countries to fixed exchange rate arrangements and a strong 
political resolve to achieve economic integration. Despite the lack of diversification 
and actual weakness of intra-GCC inter-industry trade, CU, once established, can 
expand intra-industry trade among GCC if the proper steps are taken toward more 
specialization and sophistication of their respective industries. On the other hand, CU 
may result in more synchronized business cycles provided that GCC countries 
achieve convergence in their economic structure, policies and regulations. In order to 
achieve these potential benefits of CU, GCC countries need to accelerate economic 
integration and fulfill the requirements of the GCC common market through the 
lifting of all restrictions on the free movement of goods and factors, and the creation 
of supranational institutions that would subordinate national interest for the regional 
one. This would be possible only if individual countries are willing to surrender 
















In May 25, 1981, the countries of the Arab Gulf region, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have ratified the charter 
establishing the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC countries 
hereafter). In their second Supreme Council meeting held in November 1981, the 
GCC leaders have adopted an Economic Agreement (EA) setting the stage for a full 
economic integration. The agreement had set out broad lines for the realization of 
coordination, integration and cooperation in various aspects of economic affairs. The 
Council has taken the necessary steps toward realizing the different stages of a full 
economic integration namely, a free trade area, a customs union, a common market 
and economic union. The intensification of cooperation in the relevant areas has been 
achieved through the formation of various specialized committees whose goal has 
been to implement the guidelines of the main constituent bodies of the GCC (the 
Supreme Council, Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General).
1   
 
 As a first step toward economic integration among the countries of the region, a 
Free Trade Zone was established in 1983. A decision to move ahead with the next 
phase of integration, through the establishment of a Customs Union, came at the 
Riyadh Summit of the Leaders of GCC countries in 1999. A timetable was approved 
to establish a Customs Union by the year 2005. Already in their Bahrain summit of 
the year 2000, the GCC leaders have agreed to adopt a common peg for the different 
currencies of the member states as a preliminary step toward adopting a single 
currency, considered a cornerstone for achieving full economic integration. 
 
During the last GCC summit December 30-31, 2001 in Muscat, the six GCC 
countries have agreed to a joint customs tariff of five percent by the year 2003, two 
years earlier than originally planned, and voted to create a single currency by the 
year 2010. As an intermediate stage toward establishing a single currency, they have 
also agreed to have the American dollar as a common peg for their currencies before 
the end of the year 2002. 
 
                                                 
1  See Peterson (1988, p. 149). Further details about the achievements and the official documents of GCC can 
be found in the GCC Secretariat General web-site at: http://www.gcc-sg.org.  
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In their desire to achieve monetary integration and a common currency, the GCC 
countries hold the common belief that the complete integration of product and factor 
markets requires the elimination of the transaction costs and uncertainties associated 
with the existence of separate currencies. However, the worthiness of establishing a 
common currency has been traditionally tested against several benchmarks 
established by the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) and developed by 
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Many refinements of the 
theory of OCA and the development of more sophisticated formal verification of the 
optimality of many Currency Union (CU) experiences in the world, have allowed a 
deeper analysis and evaluation of such experiences.  
 
From this perspective, we propose in this paper to develop a general framework 
to assess the preparedness of the GCC countries for CU. In section 2, we present a 
brief rationalization of CU and its costs and benefits. In section 3, we test the 
optimality criteria to assess the degree of preparedness of GCC countries for CU. 
More formal tests of optimality are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses the 
potential impact of the GCC CU experience based on the characteristics of its 
member countries. Concluding remarks are provided in section 6.  
 
2.  Optimum Currency Area: Definition and Potential Benefits  
 
First, it important to clarify some of the concepts often used in the literature of 
OCA. Broadly speaking ￿an OCA is a region for which it is optimal to have its own 
currency and its own monetary policy.￿
2  Therefore, OCA can interchangeably be 
called Monetary or Currency Union. It involves monetary integration, a single 
currency and a common central bank controlling the pool of foreign exchange 
reserves and administrating monetary policy for the union. Monetary integration, on 
the other hand,  involves the irrevocable fixing of the exchange rates,  full and 
complete convertibility of currencies, financial market integration (measures to 
liberalize capital transactions and harmonize national financial regulations and 
structures of institutions), the complete liberalization of current transactions and a 
common monetary policy.
3 In the present paper, we assume that CU is the 
arrangement that the GCC countries are trying to achieve by the year 2010. The 
                                                 
2 Frankel and Rose (1996), p.14. 
3 We owe these definitions to Tavlas (1993), p. 665.  
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attempt of GCC at achieving a common peg before the end of the year 2002, can be 
considered a form of Exchange Rate Union.   
 
 Optimality of a CU is often measured by the realization of several criteria that 
determine a priori the likely success of an OCA. These criteria evolve around how 
integrated countries of the potential group are with one another in terms of trade and 
other economic relationships as well as the extent of correlation in their business 
cycles and similarity of shocks they are subject to. 
 
An OCA is desirable to the extent that it allows exchange rates (ER) to be fixed 
and therefore reduces ER uncertainty that hampers trade and investment.
4 OCA is 
also desirable to the extent that it reduces transaction costs associated with multiple 
exchange rates. These costs relate to monitor ER fluctuations, cost of information to 
predict ER movements, the cost of currency conversion, and the cost associated with 
the need to keep and manage reserves for intra-regional trade. OCA also allows 
some economies of scale to take place in terms of freeing idle reserves, enhancing 
the role of money as a unit of account and as a means of payment. In addition, OCA 
may help reduce the ability of speculators to affect prices and disrupt the conduct of 




A further advantage of an OCA is that it may reinforce discipline and credibility 
of monetary policy especially in inflation-prone countries. The credibility of 
monetary policy can be enhanced by attaching the latter to a low-inflation anchor 
currency. This was for instance the case of the high inflation European countries of 
Italy, Spain and Portugal in the 1970￿s that wanted to tie their respective ER to that 
of Germany for its credibility for fighting inflation.  Equivalently, countries adopt a 
common currency and fix its parity against a major currency as a way to attach 
credibility to a fixed-exchange rate regime by surrendering the power to alter ER.   
 
The main disadvantages of an OCA is the loss of independence of monetary and 
exchange rate policies. Exchange rates are irrevocably fixed against one another, 
interest rates are tied to foreign interest rates, and any increase in money stock will 
                                                 
4 This advantage is sometimes downplayed by the fact that empirical studies did not find overwhelming 
detrimental impact of ER variability and by the very existence of means of hedging against ER risk.  
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result in balance of payment deficits. The monetary and exchange rate instruments 
play an important role in economic adjustment as stabilizers. When countries are 
involved in hand-tying institutional arrangements such as the ones related to an 
OCA, they give up these important policy instruments resulting in important output 
and employment losses. However, this apparent cost is mitigated to the extent that 
shocks for all the countries in the region tend to be symmetric so as to justify a 
common response, or if there are mechanisms making the adjustment to such shocks 
occur more promptly. This would be the case if prices and wages are very flexible or 
if labor and capital are mobile across members of the OCA. The cost of policy 
autonomy could also be very high in countries relying on seigniorage revenues such 
as the case for countries with underdeveloped tax systems.
6   
 
Other costs not emphasized in the literature are those associated with 
coordinating policies and those associated with the possible break down of the 
currency union. The latter costs are often factored in the OCA agreement by making 
it difficult for countries to exit or to break the rules such as through imposing 
sanctions on violators. This is, for instance, the case of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). 
 
A relatively more recent strand of literature has emphasized that the main 
benefits of CU stem from the expansion of bilateral trade among the countries of the 
Union.
7  For instance, Rose (2000) has found that trade among the countries of a CU 
could triple after the start of the union. Some have argued that this might be too 
optimistic due to some inherent upward bias in the estimation due to the endogeneity 
of the decision to join a CU (Tenreyro (2001)), or to lumping together members of 
CU and countries commonly using the money of a larger country in the same sample 
(Yeyati (2001)).  
 
Several factors have been identified in the literature for determining whether a 
country is ready to join an OCA. These factors are related to the characteristics that 
would make stable exchange rates and currency union more desirable. These are: 
 
                                                 
5 Ishiyama (1975). 
6 Tavlas 1993, p. 673. 
7 See for instance, Frankel and Rose (1996),  Rose (2000) and Rose and van Wincoop (2001).  
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i. Openness: A small country that is largely dependent on 
international trade is more likely to be affected by 
exchange rate fluctuations and uncertainty since a large 
portion of its goods is tradables. McKinnon (1969) argues 
that the ER in the case of a small open-economy becomes 
redundant as an instrument to correct balance of payments 
problems. In this case, the exchange rate is strongly linked 
to the price level in the economy to the extent that any 
variation in the ER is translated into variation in costs. 
Hence, the ER becomes an ineffective tool to improve 
competitiveness. In addition, Ishiyama (1975) argues for 
instance, that for a small open economy where a large part 
of consumed goods are imported and in the absence of 
domestic substitutes, the ER becomes an ineffective 
corrective tool given the inelastic demand for imports.
8 
For all these reasons, it is easier for a small open economy 
to enter into a currency union. 
 
ii. Factor  Mobility: In case of a shock, if two countries are 
highly integrated in the sense that labor and capital can 
freely move from one country to another, there will be a 
lesser need for the country affected by the shock to use 
the ER as a corrective tool. From this perspective, factor 
mobility plays the role of a substitute to the ER, or 
monetary policy for that matter, as an adjustment 
mechanism should a shock occur. Therefore countries 
with more mobile factors of production are better 
candidates for currency union. 
 
iii.  Degree of Commodity Diversification: If an economy is 
more diversified, it is better insulated against terms of 
trade, and other, shocks, and hence is less prone to use the 
exchange rate to mitigate the impact of the shock. 
                                                 
8 The GCC countries are a case in point.  
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Therefore, countries with diversified economies are better 
candidates for CU. 
iv.  Similarity of Production Structure: Countries that share 
common production structure are more likely to 
experience symmetric shocks and to exhibit high 
covariation in economic activities. They are less likely to 
use their exchange rates as an adjustment tool and hence 
are better candidates for CU. It should be noted that 
structural shocks could also be symmetric (or correlated), 
in addition to similarity of economic structure, because of 
dependence on common foreign shocks such as the 
fluctuation of the price of oil in international markets. 
 
v.  Price and Wage Flexibility: The flexibility of prices and 
wages obviates the need to alter the ER in case of shocks. 
Countries with flexible prices and wages are more 
inclined to engage into CU arrangements that would 
restrict the use of ER as an adjustment tool. 
 
vi.  Similarity of Inflation Rates: Similar inflation rates signal 
similarity in structure and in the conduct of economic 
policies. This would be desirable for countries that would 
like to coordinate their policies to achieve the 
requirements of a CU. 
 
vii.  Degree of Policy Integration: The similarity of policy 
attitudes is an important indicator for the potential success 
of policy coordination that will be required to achieve full 
monetary integration. 
 
viii. Political  Factors: The success of CU would depend to a 
great deal on the political will and resolve of member 
countries to achieve the goal of CU. Experience has 
shown that the political factors might be more important 
than the economic criteria.   
 
8 
In the next section, we test these optimality criteria to assess the degree of 
preparedness of GCC countries for CU.  
 
3.  GCC Countries and the Optimality Criteria for OCA 
The purpose of this section is to verify whether the criteria mentioned above 
qualify the GCC countries for OCA.  
 
i.  Openness: The GCC countries are considered among the most 
open economies in the Arab region. Openness is traditionally 
measured by the ratio of trade to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Table 1 gives the openness measures for the GCC 
countries. These ratios varies from one country to the other. 
The high ratios observed for GCC countries reflect in part the 
nature of their factor endowment, being primarily oil-
exporting countries. It also reflects the heavy reliance of these 
countries on imported consumer and capital goods owing to 
the limited availability of domestic substitutes. These factors 
combined limit the effectiveness of the ER as a tool to improve 
competitiveness or to reallocate resources among sectors.  
                                                      Table 1 
                                      Openness of GCC Countries 
YEARS  BAHRAIN  KUWAIT  OMAN  QATAR  S.ARABIA  UAE 
1980  226.50 90.00 84.56 90.90  88.98  96.05 
1985  169.03 75.63 77.14 68.86  52.66  69.30 
1990  164.21 56.50 67.67 70.98  65.47  83.28 
1995  131.97 77.46 68.67 84.53  61.13  85.40 
1996  145.59 75.89 71.63 73.08  62.62  85.69 
1997  130.98 74.53 71.77 62.97  61.06  89.17 
1998  109.40 72.46 70.03 74.23  55.50  87.02 
Average (1980-1998)  153.95 74.64 73.07 75.08  63.92  85.13 
                     Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2000. 
ii. Factor Mobility: Articles eight and nine of the Unified 
Economic Agreement between the GCC countries have 
allowed for the free movement of capital and individuals 
across GCC countries and the freedom to exercise economic 
activities. The work of many specialized committees has also 
forged the way toward concretizing the very principles 
established by the agreement. However, looking at the extent 
of joint venture and labor movement among GCC countries, it  
 
9 
is clear that factor mobility cannot be relied upon as an 
alternative adjustment mechanism to the ER. GCC still impose 
restrictions on ownership and type of activities that GCC 
nationals could exercise. On the other hand, labor market 
regulation and institutions are not very similar. This, in 
addition to factors related to welfare state, preclude labor from 
moving across GCC countries.  
 
iii. Degree of Commodity Diversification:  Despite many efforts 
at diversifying their economies, GCC countries remain heavily 
dependent on oil. On average oil represents more than 80 
percent of export receipts and budget revenues, respectively. 
Table 2 gives the normalized Hirschman export concentration 
index for the GCC countries together with a group of 
comparator countries.
9 It shows the higher level of export 
concentration of GCC countries and hence the limited 




Export Concentration Indices for GCC Countries 
Country  1980  1995 
Bahrain 0.790  0.629 
Kuwait 0.732  0.940 
Oman 0.922  0.765 
Qatar 0.934  0.731 
Saudi Arabia  0.942  0.743 
United Arab Emirates  0.870  0.619 
Brazil 0.148  0.088 
Korea 0.085  0.148 
Israel 0.264  0.274 
Turkey 0.230  0.112 
                           Source: UNCTAD (1999). 
 
Even the non-oil sector in GCC is perceived as an enclave 
whose development depends to a large extent on the 
performance of the oil sector. Productive activities in the non-
oil sector are very limited and a high share of the non-oil 
aggregate value added originates mainly from trade and 
                                                 
9These rates are taken from UNCTAD (1999). They were computed based on the 3-digit SITC 
classification, revision 2.  A value of the index closer to zero means more export diversification and vice  
versa. 
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business services. As a consequence, the economies of the 
GCC remain vulnerable to the fluctuation of oil prices in 
international markets. However, despite being exposed to 
frequent terms of trade shocks, GCC countries adopt a 
common policy stance in which the ER is not considered as a 
policy instrument that can be adjusted in case of adverse oil 
shocks. In fact, the adjustment operates mainly through the 
Government expenditures instrument. 
 
iv. Similarity of Production Structure: Broadly speaking GCC 
countries have the same production structure with a dominant 
oil-sector and a limited non-oil sector dominated by trade and 
financial  and business services. The sectoral distribution of 
GDP presented in table 3 shows the degree of similarity in 
productive activities. Coupled with the dominance of oil, the 
similarity of production structure is likely to entail  symmetric 
shocks that would eventually call for common policy reactions 
among these countries.  
 
v.  Price and wage flexibility: Prices and wages do not adjust 
systematically to accommodate frequent oil shocks. As 
mentioned earlier, Government expenditures are the main 
stabilizer of economic activities during recessionary oil 
markets. However, the limited role of prices and wages as  11 
 
Table 3 
Sectoral Composition of the GCC GDP 
 




  U.A.E.   
  
    1992  1996  2000  1992  1996  2000  1992  1996  2000  1992  1996  2000  1992  1996  2000  1992  1996  2000 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing  1.2  1.2  1.0 0.4  0.5  0.5 2.9 3.1 3.3 1.3 1.2 0.6 7.6 7.5 8.3 2.4 3.0 3.7 
Mining and Quarrying  21.4  22.6  23.6 43.0  55.5  46.0 50.9 52.3 48.3 48.5 51.2 61.4 46.8 47.1 40.8 47.3 37.1 30.2 
Manufacturing  14.3  18.3  16.5  12.5 14.8 16.0 4.6  5.0  5.3 15.6  10.0 7.8 10.4 10.9 12.7 9.2 11.6  15.3 
Electricity, Gas and Water  2.2  1.9  2.3 -1.8 -0.1 0.0 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.5 1.7 
Construction  7.4  5.4  5.4 5.0  3.2  3.5 4.0 2.7 4.0 5.8 9.1 5.8  10.3  10.3  11.6  9.8 9.4 9.5 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, 
Restaurants and Hotels  18.0  15.8  13.7  15.1  8.4  9.4 16.1  16.3  17.8 9.0 10.2 8.0  8.3  8.3  8.9 11.7 13.7  14.8 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication  10.8  9.0  9.5 6.5  5.2  7.4 6.9 7.7  10.5  4.2 4.9 5.2 7.5 7.3 8.2 6.2 7.1 8.3 
Financial Institutions and Insurance  24.2 24.7 26.0  4.1  4.1  7.8 3.1 3.9 6.5  15.5  13.7  11.1 6.9 6.5 7.4 4.9 6.4 7.0 
Real Estate and Business Services  11.9 11.8 11.7  13.9 8.8 11.1  10.6  8.8 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 10.9  10.0 
Community Social and Personal 
Services  4.8  4.6  5.2 4.0  2.2  2.8 2.2 2.0 0.0 2.5 2.2 1.9 3.3 3.2 3.7 2.6 1.8 2.0 
(Less) Imputed Bank Service  16.3 15.3 14.8 na  2.7  4.6 2.4 2.9 4.3 3.9 4.3 3.5 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.5 
                                                        
Total Industries  100  100  100 100  100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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adjustment mechanism in GCC countries does not qualify the 
ER as an alternative mechanism to either prices, wages or 
Government expenditures. In other words, the limited flexibility 
of prices and wages in GCC countries does not affect the ability 
of these countries to qualify for currency union to the extent 
that the ER is eliminated as an option for adjustment.  
 
vi. Similarity of inflation rates: GCC are not inflation-prone 
countries. However, inflation rates seem to be pro-cyclical 
picking up at periods of oil price hikes and decreasing during 
periods of oil price slumps. Inflation rates across GCC 
countries are not highly correlated despite a relative similarity 
in the conduct of macroeconomic policies namely, fiscal, 
monetary and ER policies. This might seem to suggest that 
inflation differentials among GCC countries reflect a 
difference in the microeconomic determinants of inflation (i.e. 
factors affecting the supply of and demand for goods and 
services) notably, the presence of price inertia. 
 
vii. Degree of policy integration: Many efforts have been deployed 
by the GCC countries to reinforce commonalities and 
coordinate many facets of economic and social policies. 
Article 4 of the GCC charter stipulates, among other things, 
the formulation of similar regulations in the economic and 
financial affairs. The main policies that call for coordination in 
the context of CU have already common features in the 
countries of the region. For instance, monetary and exchange 
rate policies in the GCC countries are commonly centered 
around maintaining a wedge between domestic and foreign 
interest rates in order to stabilize the ER and stem capital 
outflows or portfolio reallocation in favor of foreign assets. 
 
viii.  Political factors: GCC leaders have shown a strong 
commitment to this regional grouping. This commitment stems 
from the many common traits shared by GCC countries 
notably the similarity in their political, social, demographic  13 
and cultural structures.
10 Despite the fact that the tempo of 
economic integration has incurred minor setbacks and 
decelerations, it did not affect the resolve of GCC leaders to 
reinforce cooperation and move ahead with economic and 
political integration. Even if integration is moving at a much 
slower pace than is generally hoped, GCC countries are often 
praised for taking a pragmatic approach consisting of 
progressively reinforcing commonalities rather than hastily 
imposing unrealistic conditions to achieve such integration.
11  
 
If we consider the above factors as informal tests or eligibility criteria for CU by the 
GCC countries, we could summarize the situation as follows: 
                                                Table 4 
                      GCC Countries Eligibility Test for OCA 
 
OCA Criterion  Favorable  Unfavorable 
Openness  √    
Factor Mobility    √  
Commodity Diversification    √  
Production Structure  √    
Price and Wage Flexibility    √  
Similarity of Inflation Rates  √    
Degree of Policy Integration  √    
Political Factors  √    
  
Judging by these optimum currency area criteria, the prior conditions are not all favorable 
for CU. Does this mean that GCC countries need to provide the necessary conditions to 
fulfill these eligibility criteria and to delay the process of CU until these conditions are met? 
The immediate answer is NO. Does this mean that by 2010 all the conditions mentioned 
above will necessarily be met and only then GCC countries could establish an OCA? The 
answer here again is NO.    
                                                 
10  Peterson (1988, p. 106). 
11 Peterson op. cit.  14 
  As for the first question, the recent literature on OCA has clearly indicated that the 
so-called eligibility criteria are generally met ex post rather than ex ante. In fact, the EMU 
which is considered a historically unprecedented experience in monetary integration, has 
been carried through while few members did not fulfill the above criteria. In fact, 
Eichengreen (1990) shows for instance, that the European countries in the euro zone display 
less favorable conditions for CU than the different states of what is actually known as the 
United States of America before they became a federation of states.  
  More intra-regional trade could be generated and business cycles could become more 
aligned within the countries of the group after the launch of the OCA. But then the question 
needs to be raised differently: Will GCC OCA generate more intra-regional trade and more 
correlated business cycles among the countries of the group? The analysis in the next section 
will address this prospective question in more details.  
  Coming to the second question on whether GCC countries should wait for the year 
2010 to establish OCA, the NO answer could be justified based on the experience of EMU.  
i.  The European Monetary Integration Experience in a Nutshell:  
  The idea of a single currency for Europe has been an objective ever since the creation 
of the European Common Market in the wake of the treaty of Rome in 1957. Based on their 
historical aversion to exchange rate fluctuation and during the Hague meeting in 1969, a 
committee headed by the prime minister of Luxembourg, Pierre Werner, presented a 
proposal in what has come to be known later as the Werner report, suggesting locking EU 
exchange rates and the establishment of a federated system of European Central Banks. The 
plan was postponed after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. In 1979 the European 
community decided the creation of a network of mutually pegged exchange rates aimed at 
providing monetary stability for the region. The System has come to be known as the 
European Monetary System (EMS) or the Snake. The exchange rates were allowed to 
fluctuate within a band of  % 25 . 2 ± relative to an assigned par value. Following many events 
such as the German unification and the higher capital mobility and fiscal expansion within 
Europe, there was a pressure on the Deutschmark to appreciate that was accompanied by a 
speculative attack on the EMS on September 1992. As a result, the fluctuation margins of the 
EMS were widened to up to  % 15 ± .  The United Kingdom and Italy have chosen to exit 
EMS.  15 
The frequent currency realignments operated after the EMS (11 realignments between 
1979 and 1987) has led the EU, in 1988, to reconfirm their commitment to a European 
Monetary Union (EMU). In 1989 , a committee headed by Jacques Delors has set the 
objective of an economic and monetary union (EMU) whereby national currencies are to be 
replaced by a single currency managed by a centralized Central Bank (ECB). The road map 
for the project with an explicit plan and timetable were approved in the Maastricht Treaty in 
1991. The treaty has set a three-stage plan to establish the euro: 
•  Stage 1: Removal of remaining restrictions on capital 
movements (July 1990). 
•  Stage 2: Establishing the European Monetary Institute (EMI) 
as a precursor of a European Central Bank and imposing fiscal 
discipline on the public sector (July 1, 1994). 
•  Stage 3: Irrevocably fixing bilateral exchange rates (January 1, 
1999). 
 Convergence criteria to be fulfilled by potential candidates for EMU were set in 
terms of inflation rates, exchange rate stability, budget deficit, and Government debt.  In 
January 1999, the euro was introduced as a scriptural (non-cash) money. The euro has been 
introduced as a one-for-one replacement of the European Currency Unit (ECU).
12 The 
bilateral central rates of the currencies of the countries of the euro zone against the ECU 
have been used as benchmarks to determine the irrevocable conversion rates at which the 
euro has been substituted for individual countries￿ currencies.
13 In January 2002 euro coins 
and banknotes were introduced. A transitional period for the co-existence of the euro and 
national currencies was allowed until February 28, 2002. The euro zone actually comprises 







                                                 
12 The ECU has been created as an international currency within the EMS. It consists of weighted averages of 
currencies of the European Community Countries. All countries participating in the EMS have agreed to 
limit variation of their currency parities with respect to the central rates defined in terms of ECU.   






￿ Greece (from 1 January 2001) 
    The remaining three European Community member states namely, United Kingdom, 
Sweden and Denmark,  have decided to opt out of the euro zone but may join in the future. 
ii.  Comparing the European and GCC Experiences: 
 At prima facie, the experience of the European monetary integration and that of the 
GCC countries are not strictly comparable from the premise that the former is at a more 
advanced stage than the latter. However, it is still useful to have a clear idea about where 
the more recent GCC experience could benefit from the European one.  
EU and GCC have a very common attitude toward CU. Both hold the view that the 
complete integration of product markets requires the elimination of the transaction costs 
and uncertainties associated with the existence of separate currencies.  The EU relies 
strongly on the argument that economic integration without monetary integration cannot 
provide a political equilibrium. On the other hand, it is widely believed that monetary 
integration requires political integration in order to lend credibility to Government￿s 
commitments to pursue fiscal policies that are consistent with price stability and 
preservation of the monetary integration.
14 GCC countries seem to follow the footsteps of 
the EU in that respect. However, the political integration is yet to be seen in the case of the 
GCC countries. In the EMU experience, the decision to create a European Parliament and 
a European Central Bank as supranational entities designed to safeguard monetary 
integration came ten years before the launching of the euro. There is no clear time table or 
a formal plan for the establishment of such entities in the case of GCC. Only the loose 
deadline of end of the year 2002 to finalize the procedures of a common peg to their 
respective countries, was set.   
 
In addition, the EMU experience is based on Germany, and to a lesser extent France, 
as a driving force of the euro zone. Most of the countries in the euro zone have attached 
their currencies and monetary policies to Germany given its high credibility in fighting 
                                                 
14 Eichengreen (1996).  17 
inflation. This helps achieve convergence and coordination of policies between the partner 
countries. In the case of GCC countries, such a focal point for convergence simply does 
not exist.  
 
More importantly, the European experience in achieving CU has focused on the 
Maastricht convergence criteria to impose the necessary fiscal discipline to preserve 
monetary integration. GCC countries are yet to establish such a mechanism.  
 
An additional factor that made the birth of the euro less complicated is the legacy of 
EMS, which is a system of tying up currencies within a narrow band. The existence of a 
common denominator, ecu, consisting of a synthetic basket of European currencies made 
the transition to the euro a relatively easy operation. The euro was simply set as a one-to-
one ratio with the ecu.  
 
The GCC countries have relatively similar exchange rate arrangements.  Up until 
December 31, 1999, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE peg their respective currencies 
to the SDR; Oman to the U.S. dollar and Kuwait to a basket of currencies determined on 
the basis of the currencies of its major trade and financial partners.  Recently Bahrain and 
Qatar switched the peg of their currencies from SDR to the dollar. In practice, all GCC 
countries￿ currencies hold a stable relationship to the dollar. This explains the recent 
decision of GCC countries to establish the dollar as the common currency their domestic 
currencies are to be pegged to. The implementation of this intermediate stage will be a step 
forward toward establishing the common GCC currency.  This pre-commitment to fixed 
exchange rates may help demonstrate the resolve of GCC to financial discipline and 
achieve the necessary credibility for monetary integration. 
 
4.  Testing OCA for GCC: Generalized Purchasing Power Parity Approach 
The Generalized Purchasing Power Parity Approach (G-PPP) for assessing the viability 
of forming a currency area was developed and tested by Enders and Hurn (1994).  The main 
idea of the approach starts from the fact that real exchange rates of the countries potentially 
candidates  for a currency union area are non-stationary. This is so because the fundamental 
macroeconomic variables (forcing variables) that determine real exchange rates are also non-
stationary and follow different growth paths. For countries to qualify for a successful 
currency area, they should experience convergence and symmetrical shocks to their 
fundamentals. The latter should move together and be sufficiently interrelated so that the real  18 
exchange rates will have common stochastic trends.  Therefore, the theory advocates that the 
real exchange rates within a currency area should be co-integrated. This means that the 
bilateral real exchange rates of the countries of the currency area should have at least one 
linear combination that is stationary.  
 
  The G-PPP test consists of finding whether there are cointegrated vectors between 
the exchange rates of the CU. In other words, one should test whether an equilibrium 
relationship exists between the different bilateral real exchange rates such that: 
 
) 1 ( ......... 1 1 13 13 0 12 t nt n t t RER RER RER ε β β α + + + + =
 
 
where  it RER1  is the real exchange rate between the base country and country i in period 
t,   0 α is the constant term and  ij β are the parameters of the cointegrating vector and represent 
linkages among the economies of the currency area, and  t ε is a white noise disturbance term. 
 
The real exchange rate series are constructed using  two alternative base countries 
namely,  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America (USA).  The 
choice of KSA as a base country is obvious given the economic importance of the Saudi 
economy in GCC, and may represent the dominant country in forming a successful currency 
area. However, the choice of the USA is also important given the tight relation of GCC 
currencies with the US dollar. 
    
 








 where  t S is the nominal exchange rate expressed as the number of national currency units 
for one unit of the currency of the base country. 
*
t P and  t P are the consumer price index in 
the base and the home country, respectively. The resulting real exchange rates are plotted in 
Figure 1. The annual data form 1960 to 1999 on nominal exchange rates and consumer price 
indices for GCC and USA were obtained from the IFS CD ROM of the IMF (2002) and 
World Development Indicators CD ROM of the World Bank (2001). For computational 
purposes, we use the logarithm of the real exchange rates as defined above.    19 
 
During the past two decades, GCC￿s currencies have fluctuated only moderately given 
their close relationship to the US dollar. There is also a striking similarity of  the variation in 
the nominal dollar rates of GCC currencies. The coefficient of variation is almost the same 
for all GCC countries (0.11) except for the Omani Riyal which fluctuated less than the other 
GCC currencies (0.06). In fact,  the Bahraini Dinar did not change from the rate of 0.377 BD 
to the dollar since 1981. The Omani Riyal was also fixed at the rate of 0.3845 riyal to the 
dollar since 1987, the UAE Dirham at 3.677 since 1981, the Saudi Riyal at 3.745 since 1987, 
and the Qatari Riyal at 3.64 since 1981. Only the Kuwaiti Dinar has fluctuated within a very 
narrow margin.   Despite this apparent stability of GCC nominal exchange rates since the 
1980s,  the ADF stationarity test applied to a longer sample reveals that GCC nominal rates 
are in fact non-stationary.
15 This can be attributed to the fluctuation of the nominal exchange 
rates prior to the period 1980-1999. The GCC rates computed against the Saudi Riyal also 
reflect the same picture. However, the volatility of  the GCC currencies with respect to the 
Saudi Riyal is less than that of the US dollar.  
 
Real Exchange rates computed for both base countries (USA and KSA) exhibit higher 
volatility than nominal exchange rates. In fact, the coefficient of variation is almost double 
the coefficient of the nominal exchange rates. The ADF stationarity test shows that real 
exchange rates in GCC are not stationary.  
 
                                                 
15 In fact, when the ADF test is applied to GCC data sample from 1980 to 1999,  it turns out that nominal 
rates are stationary.   20 
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The first step in testing G-PPP is to see whether the real exchange rates in the GCC are 
in fact non-stationary. From the casual inspections of the graphs of such variables, it is 
apparent that the RERs are not stationary. This hypothesis is confirmed by the formal tests of 
Dickey Fuller (1979) and Phillips Peron (1988). The results of these tests and for the two 
base countries are given in Table 5.  It is clear from the table that nominal and real exchange 
rates are not stationary.  The null hypothesis that the data generation process contains a unit 
root in the exchange rate data cannot be rejected.  However, the test is rejected at the 5%  21 
level when applied to the first differences of nominal and real exchange rates. Therefore, 
both series are integrated of order one. 
 
The second stage in testing the OCA consists of conducting cointegration analysis. The 
Johansen (1991, 1995) approach to the estimation and testing of cointegrated relationships is 
used. Both trace and maximum eigenvalues tests are used to determine the number of 
cointegrating equations. The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating 
relations against the alternative of k cointegrating relations. The maximum eigenvalue 
statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative of r+1 
relations.  
 
ِ In order to estimate the parameters of the cointegrating relationships, we need to 
determine the lag length of the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model underlying the long-run 
relationship given by equation (1), so that estimation is possible and error terms are 
approximately white noise. However, due to the small sample size and severe data 
unavailability, we could not experiment with high-order VAR models. In our case, VAR(1) 
seems to fit the data reasonably well and the errors terms of the model are fairly well 
behaved.  
 
Table 6 gives the results of testing for the number of cointegrating vectors in terms of 
maximum Eigenvalue,  max λ , trace,  trace λ , statistics, and the corresponding eigenvalues, λ.
16 
As can be seen from the table, the trace test suggests the existence of up to three 
cointegrating vectors, while the  max λ  suggests four. These tests were conducted at the 90 
percent significance level. Since the results were not in perfect agreement and to minimize 
the risk of failing to reject an incorrect null hypothesis, we reconducted these tests using the 
95 percent critical values given by Osterwald-Lenum (1992). The  max λ  and  trace λ  critical 
values for r=3 were 21.07 and 31.52, respectively.  Hence, the hypothesis of the existence of 
three contegrating vectors or less is accepted. Upon further observation, the 95 percent 
significance level  max λ  test accepts the null of r=2, since the 95 percent critical value was 
27.14, higher than the computed value of 25.48.  
                                                 
16 Given that no clear trend was detected in the data, intercepts were only included in the cointegrating 
relationships.  22 
Table 5 
ADF Stationarity Tests of GCC Exchange Rates 
 
Base Country = USA 
Base Country = KSA 
Nominal  Real 
Nominal  Real  Country 
Level  1
st Differences  Level  1
st Differences  Level  1
st Differences  Level  1
st Differences 




















SA (63-99)  -0.75  -3.66
* -0.122 -2.14
* -  -  -  - 
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Table 6 
Testing for Cointegration 
                       Trace                                                                  λ max  
_____________________________                  _____________________________  
H0          H1           Stat.             90%                    H0          H1           Stat.          90%         λ  
                                             critical value                                                      critical value  
r = 0      r > 0       196.36        97.17                     r = 0       r = 1         101.44        25.51      0.995 
r ≤  1      r > 1       94.92         71.66                      r = 1       r = 2            39.63       21.74      0.876
r ≤  2      r > 2        55.29         49.91                      r = 2       r = 3           25.48        18.03      0.739 
r ≤  3      r > 3        29.80         31.88                      r = 3       r = 4           16.29        14.09      0.576
r ≤  4      r > 4        13.51         17.79                      r = 4       r = 5             8.51        10.29      0.361
r ≤  5     r > 5        5.00              7.50                      r = 5       r = 6             5.00           7.50     0.231
  
Based on these results, we conclude that there are two cointegrating vectors. The 
estimates of the cointegrating vectors,β , and the associated adjustment coefficients vectors, 
α , are presented in table 7.  
 
Table 7 
Cointegrating and Adjustment Vectors * 
 
  Constant  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar  Saudi 
Arabia  U.A.E. 
1 β   -1.609 -0.458  -0.188 -0.019  1.302  1.000  -1.952 













2 β   1.884 -0.307  1.566 -0.579 -0.645 1.000  -1.470 













* The cointegrating vectors are normalized so that Saudi Arabia￿s exchange rate is the reference.   
   T-values are in parentheses. 
 
While the β  coefficients may be interpreted as long-term elasticities, the α ’s are the 
adjustment coefficients indicating the speed of adjustment toward long-term equilibrium.  
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Overall, the presence of cointegrating relationships is a formal proof that G-PPP holds 
and that GCC meet the requirements of a CU. However, cointegration is a statistical concept 
and it is often very difficult to give  sound economic interpretation to all cointegrating 
relationships. In our case, we favor the first cointegrating vector  on the ground that all 
adjustment coefficients have  the appropriate negative sign. The exchange rates of all GCC, 
except Oman, enter this cointegrating relationship significantly. The zero restriction 
Likelihood Ratio test for the Omani exchange rate could not be rejected at the 95 percent 
level. This may reflect the fact that Oman is the least favorable candidate for CU. This 
interpretation is compatible with the relatively low correlation between the macroeconomic 
fundamentals of Oman and those of the other GCC countries.
17 Furthermore, the α ￿s 
coefficients for Oman and the UAE are very small and represent a slower adjustment process 
to the equilibrium equation in the sense that deviations from G-PPP can persist for a 
relatively long period of time. Differences in adjustment speed may also reflect differences 
in country circumstances that would call for different policy measures. From this 
perspective, Oman and UAE may be considered a less homogeneous subset than the rest of 
GCC countries for the constitution of a CU.   
 
It should be noted that many G-PPP-based tests in the literature reject the OCA 
hypothesis despite stronger correlations between forcing variables than those observed in the 
case of GCC. Overall, we find that G-PPP holds for the case of GCC. This rather 
unconventional  result can be rationalized, putting aside data limitations and modeling 
difficulties, by the fact that GCC represent a rare case where exchange rates are stable and 
anchored strongly to the US dollar and inflation rates are relatively similar.
18  This  result, 
however, does not preclude forcing variables from drifting apart and should not be 
interpreted as a sign of convergence among the economies of GCC.  The success of GCC 
monetary union requires that more policy coordination and synchronization be undertaken, 
and further steps to create a single market where all restrictions on the movement of goods 




                                                 
17 See table 11. 
18 To test the sensitivity of the results to sample limitations, the stationarity and cointegration analysis were 
carried out using monthly data for Kuwait, Bahrain, and KSA using more than 200 observations. We 
obtain the same results: the exchange rates for these countr ies were cointegrated.    25 
5. Potential of GCC Currency Union 
 
As argued earlier, the benefits of a currency union are long-term while its costs are 
immediate. In the long-run, the creation of a single currency may boost intra-regional trade 
and investment and may help, over time, to reduce country differences and achieve 
convergence with respect to economic policy.  However, the fulfillment of these long-term 
gains relies on features and characteristics of the countries of the grouping. 
 
Despite the signing of a free trade area, inter-GCC trade remains weak. The share of 
intra-GCC commodity exports in the total exports of each country remains very limited. 
The average for these shares during the period 1989-1999 are 21.3% for Bahrain, 1.6% for 
Kuwait, 17.1% for Oman, 6.3% for Qatar, 6.6% for Saudi Arabia and 4.6% for U.A.E. The 
stagnation of these shares rather than their weaknesses is the more alarming. The degree of 
intra-GCC trade integration, as shown in Table 8, is relatively weak in comparison with 
other economic blocs in the world.  
 
As shown previously in table 2, the limited diversification of GCC exports offers very 
limited possibilities of expanding inter-industry trade. In addition and as argued  by 
Peterson (1988), the existence of similar second industries in the different GCC countries 
￿could generate long-term detrimental structural overlap￿ that would stifle efforts to 
develop regional trade. 
 
We argue, however, that a single currency might reinforce intra-industry trade if the 
respective GCC countries achieve concerted efforts at increasing specialization  and 
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Table 8 
Regional Trade Blocs Exports within Bloc as 
% of Total Exports of the Bloc 
 
  1970  1980  1990  1999 
EU  59.5 60.8 65.9 62.9 
NAFIA  36.0 33.0 41.4 54.6 
APEC  57.8 57.9 68.3 71.9 
CEFTA 12.9  14.8  9.9  11.9 
MERCOSUR  9.4 11.6 8.9 20.5 
CEMAC  4.8 1.6 2.3 1.6 
GCC  2.9 3.0 8.0 6.8 
UMA  1.4 0.3 2.9 2.5 
 
     Source : WDI (2001) 
 
Table 9 that follows gives the Intra-Industry Indices (IIT) in Manufactures for GCC 
and other comparator countries. The table reveals that GCC countries exhibit low levels of 
IIT despite the efforts of countries like Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia, at expanding 
their industrial base. Unless, GCC countries put more efforts in intensifying industrial 
specialization, the competition in second industries would undermine the efforts at 
expanding intra-GCC trade.  
With respect to capital movement, GCC countries still impose various forms of control 
on inward direct investment by GCC nationals. These controls vary from prior approval 
(Oman) to limited ownership of capital (Kuwait, Qatar and U.A.E.) and  restrictions on 
types of activities GCC nationals could engage in (Kuwait, U.A.E.).  The complete lifting 
of these restrictions will be an important step toward setting up the Gulf Common Market 
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Table 9 
IIT in Manufactures for GCC Countries 
 
Country  1985  1997 
Bahrain  0.21 0.31 
Kuwait  0.12 0.08 
Oman  0.12 0.24 
Qatar  0.09 0.07 
Saudi Arabia  0.09 0.19 
United Arab Emirates  0.28 0.28 
Brazil  0.51 0.54 
Korea  0.41 0.61 
Israel  0.59 0.66 
Turkey  0.16 0.33 
Source: Yeats and Ng (2000, p.22). 
GCC have taken many measures aimed at mobilizing financial resources and facilitating 
the movement of people and capital. For instance, the Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC), 
established in 1982 with a capital of US$2.1 billion owned equally by all GCC countries, has 
for objective the mobilization of financial resources for the implementation of projects 
promoting the productive sectors in the respective GCC countries.  
Recently,  national banks were allowed to open branches in other GCC economies.   The 
GCC also established the Gulf Network of the National Automated Teller Machines (ATM). 
Many of the achievements reported in GCC General Secretariat include ￿the practice of 
retail and wholesale trade, ownership of shares and real estates, engaging in different 
professions and economic activities such as agriculture, industry, contracting, animal 
resources, establishment of hotels and restaurants, establishment of training centres, and 
obtaining loans from industry development funds and banks in the GCC States.￿
19  
The establishment of a common GCC currency is expected to help advance economic 
integration by forcing member countries to deregulate their labor and product markets and 
eliminate any barriers to the free movement of capital. With a single currency, arbitrage 
                                                 
19 Economic Achievements as described in the official documents of GCC Secretariat General. See web-site 
at: http://www.gcc-sg.org. 
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between countries with different market conditions become easier and countries with the less 
favorable conditions will be affected negatively. 
Despite the apparent similarity among GCC countries and the previous efforts at 
reinforcing commonalities, their business cycles do not seem to be much synchronized. 
Tables 10 and 11 give the tests of mean and variance equality of the  forcing variables of 
GCC and the crude measures of association between these variables, respectively.  
Table 10 






Inflation (CPI)  1.048  54.16
* 
Inflation (GDP)  0.368  78.60
* 
Per Capita GDP  81.498
* 211.0150
* 
Real GDP  78.60
* 339.02
* 
GDP Growth  2.567
* 54.808
* 
Interest Rate (Deposit)  9.134
* 20.193
* 
Real Exchange Rate (USA)  379.68
* 300.1772
* 
Real Exchange Rate (KSA)  368.84
* 600.26
* 
Money Growth  0.388  40.151
* 
Nominal Exchange Rate  1604.69
* 429.07
* 
Interest Rate (lending)  19.270
* 34.174
* 
* Significant at 5% 
Table 10 summarizes the t-test of equality of mean and the variance of   ten macro 
fundamental variables across GCC. The null hypothesis of equal mean and variance is 
strongly rejected for all the variables except for broad monetary growth and inflation.  Table 
11 gives the correlation matrices of these macro variables in GCC. It also reflects the 
dissimilarity in the behavior of the fundamental macroeconomic variables.  The correlation 
coefficients of real GDP growth rates between GCC are not uniform and very disparate.   29 
Table 11 
Pairewise Correlation matrix 
 
Output  Money growth 
 
Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar  KSA  UAE  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar  KSA  UAE 
Bahrain  1.00 0.46 -0.15 0.47 0.54 0.06 1.00 0.38 0.44 0.28 0.37 0.40 
Kuwait    1.00  -0.018  -0.24 0.05 -0.08    1.00 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.51 
Oman      1.00 -0.36 0.02 -0.04      1.00 0.63 0.62 0.84 
Qatar      1.00  0.39  0.38      1.00  0.86  0.53 
KSA       1.00  0.41       1.00  0.67 
UAE        1.00        1.00 
Inflation  Interest rate 
 
Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar  KSA  UAE  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar  KSA  UAE 
Bahrain  1.00 0.70 -0.12 0.55 0.78 0.51 1.00 0.44 0.78 0.44 0.90 0.71 
Kuwait    1.00 0.70 0.56 0.51 0.92    1.00 0.20 -0.15  -0.26 0.77 
Oman      1.00 0.16 0.38 0.95      1.00 0.73 0.75  - 
Qatar      1.00  0.49  -     1.00  0.58  - 
KSA       1.00  0.58       1.00  - 
UAE        1.00        1.00 
Per Capital income  Real Exchange Rate 
 
Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar  KSA  UAE  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar  KSA  UAE 
Bahrain  1.00 0.45 -0.92 0.92 0.84 0.86 1.00 0.69 0.93 0.90 0.82 0.58 
Kuwait    1.00 -0.88 0.73 -0.54 0.56    1.00 0.43 0.82 0.91 0.32 
Oman      1.00 -0.95 0.55 -0.95      1.00 0.91 0.70 0.87 
Qatar      1.00  0.60  0.93      1.00  0.91  0.88 
KSA       1.00  0.85       1.00  0.49 
UAE        1.00        1.00  30 
For instance, Oman￿s correlation coefficient with Kuwait and Bahrain are negative and 
very low. The same is true for UAE where growth correlation with other GCC is very weak. 
The lack of synchronization in economic activity despite the common dominance of the oil 
sector could be explained by the asymmetric reaction to the same oil shocks. In other words,  
oil price fluctuation has different impacts on the countries of the region. Some countries face 
more binding domestic constraints than others and have to adjust differently to the same 
shocks. For example, following the 1998 oil price decline,  growth in the UAE declined from 
2.1 % in 1997 to ￿5.6 % in 1998, while it declined only from 3.0% to 2.1 % in Bahrain.  
In contrast, and as shown in table 12, economic activity in the countries of the euro zone 
seems to be more synchronized with higher correlation coefficients of real GDP. This shows 
that the European economies were more convergent before the launch of the euro than their 
GCC counterparts.   Convergence in the case of the euro countries might reflect the longer 
experience of their region with the gradual integration of their markets and policies. GCC 
countries have done some mileage in that regard.
20  Nonetheless, convergence and 
synchronization of their business cycles will not be achieved  unless goods and capital 
markets become more integrated.  As argued by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996), while CU 
may help increase trade and hence economic integration, a common market increases the 
readiness for monetary integration. 
On the other hand, as long as differences persist in the political economy determinants of 
adjustment and reform in the respective GCC countries, CU might not be stable if ever 
achieved. Individual countries might face different domestic conditions that call for specific 
measures not likely to be equally acceptable by other countries of the group. In this case, 
political unification through the establishment of a supranational entity that would 
subordinate national interest in favor of regional interest and surrender  some of the national 
prerogatives, is a necessary step toward achieving both economic and monetary 
integration.
21 
                                                 
20 Among the achievements of GCC in terms of unification of policies are a Joint Agricultural Policy and 
common strategies for industrial development, population, and  long-term development.   
21  Peterson (1988, p. 157) quotes the former GCC associate secretary general for economic affairs, Abdulla 
Al-Kuwaiz, in proposing that the Secretariat General become such a supranational entity with ￿more teeth 
from the Supreme Council￿.   31 
Table 12 
Correlation Matrix of Euro Zone’s Real GDP (excluding Germany) 
1970-1998 
 
Austria Belgium Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain
Austria 1.000
Belgium 0.998 1.000
Finland 0.956 0.964 1.000
France 0.996 0.998 0.972 1.000
Greece 0.982 0.987 0.965 0.990 1.000
Ireland 0.950 0.942 0.898 0.933 0.910 1.000
Italy 0.988 0.991 0.974 0.996 0.990 0.907 1.000
Luxembourg 0.961 0.951 0.891 0.943 0.902 0.973 0.921 1.000
Netherlands 0.994 0.991 0.943 0.986 0.967 0.972 0.972 0.979 1.000
Portugal 0.996 0.996 0.957 0.995 0.975 0.951 0.985 0.966 0.992 1.000
Spain 0.994 0.995 0.956 0.992 0.973 0.948 0.981 0.965 0.993 0.995 1.000  
          Source: Computed by authors based on data from the World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM 2000. 
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Historically, there seems to be ample evidence that political unification has preceded 
monetary unification. Eichengreen (1996) gives few cases in point from the U.S., Germany  
and Italy to demonstrate the importance of political integration. There needs to be a firm 
conviction about the importance of such entity for GCC countries, in order to confer 
credibility to the common currency project. 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
In this paper, an attempt at evaluating the readiness of GCC countries at establishing a 
currency union is conducted using formal tests, based on G-PPP theory, and informal tests 
based on the OCA literature. Our analysis shows that despite progress achieved on many 
fronts, GCC countries are yet to fulfill the necessary pre-conditions for the establishment of 
CU. The structure of their economies remains dominated by the oil sector, intra-regional 
trade is very limited and, unlike what many believe, there does not seem to be evidence of 
convergence in their main macroeconomic  fundamentals nor synchronization of  their 
business cycles.  The main factors that are favorable for the establishment of CU are the 
implicit commitment by all GCC to fixed exchange rate arrangements and a strong political 
resolve to achieve economic integration. 
Starting from the premise, advanced by the recent strand in OCA literature, that countries 
are more likely to verify the optimality criteria of CU ex-post rather than ex-ante and that 
expansion of trade and more correlated business cycles are the outcome rather than the 
prerequisites of CU; we have attempted to analyze the potential impact of CU on GCC. We 
argue that despite the lack of diversification and actual weakness of intra-GCC inter-industry 
trade, CU can expand intra-industry trade among GCC if the proper steps are taken toward 
more specialization and sophistication of their respective industries. On the other hand, CU 
may result in more synchronized business cycles provided that GCC countries achieve 
convergence in their economic structure, policies and regulations. 
 One way to do that is to accelerate economic integration and achieve the requirements of 
the GCC common market through the lifting of all restrictions on the free movement of 
goods and factors. An additional means of achieving convergence is through political 
integration or the creation of supranational institutions that would subordinate national 
interest for the regional one. This will be possible only if individual countries are willing to 
surrender some of their political and policy prerogatives.  The recent European experience as 
well as ample historical evidence points to the imperative of political unification as a 
predecessor for CU.        33 
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